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Abstract: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg is well known for her restrained
jurisprudence, and yet one line of her opinions has been criticized as
"substantially illegitimate." Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. and Sinochem
International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp. both involve
"jurisdictional resequencing," which in certain circumstances permits a
federal court to decide a threshold jurisdictional question, such as forum non
conveniens, before it resolves the question of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Because jurisdictional resequencing allows courts to decide questions when
they may in fact lack subject-matter jurisdiction, at least one critic has said
this doctrine is "close to the line that separates valid authority from
unprincipled usurpation." In this Article, I argue that, contrary to this
criticism, both Ruhrgas and Sinochem demonstrate Justice Ginsburg's
restrained decisionmaking. In particular, both decisions reflect her view that
the federal courts, as the undemocratic institutions in our government, should
be careful to exercise their power when it might trench on the powers of the
elected branches. By avoiding complex questions of subject-matter
jurisdiction-control of which, apart from constitutional constraints, is given
to Congress-the courts avoid questions about the margins of their power,
precisely the kinds of questions that might involve judicial overreaching.
* Assistant Professor, the University of Alabama School of Law. Law clerk, the Honorable
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, October Term 2001. I would like to thank the New England Law
Review for inviting me to participate in this celebration of the Justice's invaluable
contributions to the law.
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INTRODUCTION
Ruth Bader Ginsburg pursues a jurisprudence characterized by
restraint: as she has written, such restraint is essential for an undemocratic
branch in a democratic republic.' It is surprising, then, to find that one line
of opinions written by Justice Ginsburg has been criticized as "substantially
illegitimate."
2
1. Upon Justice Ginsburg's nomination to the Supreme Court, New York Times reporter
Linda Greenhouse referred to her as a "'judicial-restraint liberal[,]' [bjy [which,
Greenhouse] meant that she has a liberal vision of a muscular and broadly inclusive
Constitution coupled with a pragmatist's sense that the most efficacious way of achieving
the Constitution's highest potential as an engine of social progress is not necessarily through
the exercise of judicial supremacy." Linda Greenhouse, Learning to Listen to Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 213, 218 (2004) (quoting Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme
Court: A Sense of Judicial Limits, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1994, at Al). Justice Ginsburg's
restraint famously extends to her views on judicial writing: Cases should be decided
narrowly for the most part; concurrences are written, not to trumpet one's own views, but to
clarify and enhance understanding; dissents are written only when necessary and only in
reasoned tones. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1185, 1191-93 (1992) [hereinafter Judicial Voice]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on
Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REv. 133, 134 (1990) [hereinafter Writing Separately]; see
also generally David L. Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg's First Decade: Some Thoughts About
Her Contributions in the Fields of Procedure and Jurisdiction, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 30-
31 (2004); see generally Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Ginsburg and the Middle Way, 68
BROOK. L. REv. 629 (2003).
2. Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal
Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2001).
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Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. 3 and Sinochem International Co. v.
Malaysia International Shipping Corp.4 both involve what has been labeled
"jurisdictional resequencing. 5 Both permit a federal court to decide a
threshold jurisdictional question, such as personal jurisdiction or forum non
conveniens, before resolving the question of subject-matter jurisdiction
when the subject-matter jurisdiction question is complex and the other
threshold question is more easily resolved.6
A plurality of the Court had flatly rejected a similar approach when
the easier question involved the merits of the case in Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Environment.7 There, the plurality stated that a complicated
subject-matter jurisdiction question (in that case, standing) could not be
ignored even when the same party would win under the simpler merits
question-in other words, a court could not assume "hypothetical
jurisdiction" to reach the merits.
Some critics have contended that the jurisdictional-resequencing
cases partake of the same flaw as did the hypothetical-jurisdiction cases.
They involve a court making a decision when it lacks the power to do so.
Thus, Professor Shapiro has described his reaction to Ruhrgas as one of
"puzzlement[]" 9 and Scott Idleman has written a lengthy article denouncing
the Ruhrgas decision.'0 Sinochem is presumably subject to similar
criticism, although few explicit criticisms have yet been made.
3. 526 U.S. 574 (1999).
4. 127 S. Ct. 1184 (2007).
5. Idleman, supra note 2, at 3. Idleman coined this term based on the language in
Ruhrgas. See id. at 3 n.5 ("The Court described the practice as the 'sequencing of
jurisdictional issues."' (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584)).
6. See Sinochem, 127 S. Ct. at 1188; Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 578. Sinochem specifically
involved a situation where the lower courts concluded they had subject-matter jurisdiction,
were unsure of personal jurisdiction, and dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds; the
Supreme Court nevertheless clearly held that a forum non conveniens dismissal could occur
prior to a finding of jurisdiction under either head. See Sinochem, 127 S. Ct. at 1188.
7. See 523 U.S. 83, 91-93, 101 (1998).
8. Id. at 101. As I discuss in more detail below, infra notes 28-34, an absolute ban on
"hypothetical jurisdiction" received only plurality support. As the Court acknowledged in
Ruhrgas, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined on the predicate that there had been
exceptions to the rule and might be others in the future. See 526 U.S. at 577. The Steel Co.
case thus stands for the proposition that a court "generally" must resolve subject matter
jurisdiction before addressing the merits. See id.
9. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 30-3 1.
10. Idleman, supra note 2, at 3-5; see also Jack H. Friedenthal, The Crack in the Steel
Case, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 258, 259-60, 268 (2000) (arguing that the reasoning of the
Ruhrgas decision is flawed).
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
How is this possible? How could someone like Justice Ginsburg,
known for her restrained decisionmaking, write opinions that are alleged to
permit outrageous and ultra vires action by the federal courts?
In this Article, I suggest that her critics have misunderstood the
purpose of this line of cases. Both Ruhrgas and Sinochem demonstrate
Justice Ginsburg's restrained decisionmaking. In particular, both decisions
reflect her view that the federal courts, as the undemocratic institutions in
our government, should be careful to exercise their power when it might
trench on the powers of the elected branches.1' By avoiding complex
questions of subject-matter jurisdiction--control of which, apart from
constitutional constraints, is given to Congress-the courts avoid questions
about the margins of their power, precisely the kinds of questions that
might involve judicial overreaching.
A similar respect for the democratic branches lies behind other
opinions by Justice Ginsburg, including Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. 12 Ruhrgas and Sinochem are thus not
departures from Justice Ginsburg's jurisprudence of restraint, but wholly
consistent with it.
In Part I of this Article, I sketch the contours of the jurisdictional-
resequencing cases and summarize the criticisms made of Ruhrgas and
Sinochem. In Part II, I offer an alternative view of these cases, one that
rejects the possibility that Justice Ginsburg authorized court action ultra
vires; I explain that these cases instead reflect her insistence that courts
recognize their proper role in our republic. I then, in Part III, demonstrate
the consistency of Ruhrgas and Sinochem with Justice Ginsburg's larger
jurisprudence. Far from being the puzzling or even lawless decisions that
critics fear, both cases demonstrate her "admirable willingness to exercise
judicial restraint."'
13
I. Jurisdictional Resequencing and Its Critics
Ruhrgas and Sinochem both involve the following question: "must
subject-matter jurisdiction precede [other threshold jurisdiction questions]
on the decisional line? Or, do federal district courts have discretion to avoid
a difficult question of subject-matter jurisdiction when the absence of
11. See Roy M. MERSKY ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 18
HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOTMINATIONS OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 1916-1993: RUTH BADER GINSBURG
260 (1995). "My approach, I believe, is neither 'liberal' nor 'conservative.' Rather, it is
rooted in the place of the judiciary--ofjudges-in our democratic society."Id.
12. 528 U.S. 167, 174, 180 (2000) (addressing the issues of standing and mootness).
13. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 22.
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[jurisdiction on another theory] is the surer ground?"' 4 Both cases arise
against the "backdrop" '1 5 of the Steel Co. decision, where four justices ruled
that a federal court could never address a merits question before resolving
subject-matter jurisdiction, 6 and three additional justices joined on the
condition that there might be some exceptions to that rule. 7
The jurisdictional-resequencing cases-and the critics thereof-are
best understood against the Steel Co. backdrop. In this Part, I therefore
describe the Steel Co. case in some detail before turning to Ruhrgas,
Sinochem, and their critics.
A. The Jurisdiction-Merits Sequence: Steel Co.
Steel Co. is better known as a standing case, 8 but its importance here
lies in the analysis that preceded the standing decision. In that analysis, the
Court rejected a doctrine, hypothetical jurisdiction, that had been followed
widely in the lower courts.' Courts had assumed jurisdiction by hypothesis
in order to resolve cases by reaching simple merits questions. The logic
was one of efficiency: if you know the party is going to lose on the merits
regardless, why waste time with a complicated jurisdiction question?20 The
Supreme Court, however, rejected that efficiency argument in Steel Co.
14. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577-78 (1999); see also Sinochem
Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Co., 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1190 (2007).
15. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 577.
16. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1998).
17. See id. at 110-11 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, J.; Breyer, J.,
concurring in part).
18. See, e.g., Heather Elliott, Comment, Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 709, 709 n.3 (1999) (stating that "Steel Company is viewed
as the new statement of standing law, replacing Lujan as the standard reference for standing
doctrine in recent cases involving standing" and collecting cases). See also generally
Michael J. Wray, Still Standing? Citizen Suits, Justice Scalia's New Theory of Standing and
the Decision in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 8 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 207
(2000); Aaron Roblan & Samuel H. Sage, Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better
Environment: The Evisceration of Citizen Suits Under the Veil of Article III, 12 TUL. ENvTL.
L.J. 59 (1998).
19. See, e.g., Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal
Courts, 52 VAND. L. REv. 235, 237 & n.5 (1999) (identifying cases from every circuit using
hypothetical jurisdiction).
20. To put the matter colloquially, a court asserting hypothetical jurisdiction is saying
something like this to the plaintiff: "If there is no jurisdiction, you lose. The jurisdiction
question is hard, though, and so there might be jurisdiction; but assuming there is, you
obviously lose on the merits. So either way, you lose." Addressing the straightforward
question first thus makes the court's work easier.
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
The facts of the case are simple. In 1995, Citizens for a Better
Environment (CBE) gave notice of hazardous chemical inventory
violations to The Steel Company under the Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA). 2' The company corrected its
violations within the 60-day notice period, but CBE nevertheless filed suit
in federal district court, seeking civil penalties for the past violations.22 The
district court ultimately dismissed for failure to state a claim, 23 holding that
EPCRA did not permit suit for past violations.24 Interpreting EPCRA to the
contrary, the Seventh Circuit reversed. 25 This created a split with the Sixth
Circuit on the meaning of EPCRA,26 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.27
The Court did not, in the end, resolve that split.28 To interpret the
statute would involve reaching the merits of the case, but The Steel
Company had challenged CBE's standing for the first time in its petition
for certiorari. Was it possible to reach the merits without first deciding the
jurisdictional question? In other words, was hypothetical jurisdiction a
permissible practice? The Court gave a slightly qualified "no."
A plurality of the Court concluded that a federal court can never reach
the merits until it has ascertained that subject-matter jurisdiction is
present.29 This opinion imposed a strict "order of operations 30 on the
federal courts: Subject-matter jurisdiction must always be assured before
any merits inquiry may proceed. The doctrine of "hypothetical jurisdiction"
that had been followed in the lower courts was illegitimate: "For a court to
pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal
law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to
,031act ultra vires.
21. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1998).
22. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., No. 95-C-4534, 1995 WL 758122, at
*1-2 (N.D. I11. Dec. 21, 1995).
23. Id. at *2; FED. R. Cfv. P. 12(b)(6).
24. See Steel Co., 1995 WL 758122, at *4.
25. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1242, 1245 (7th Cir.
1996), vacated, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
26. Compare At. States Legal Found., Inc. v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc.,
61 F.3d 473, 475 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding EPCRA did not permit suit for past violations),
with Steel Co., 90 F.3d at 1244-45.
27. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 519 U.S. 1147, 1147 (1997).
28. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 109-10 (1998).
29. Id. at 93-94.
30. Justice Breyer uses this term in his concurrence. Id. at 111 (Breyer, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 101-02 (majority opinion). Nor could the EPCRA question be viewed as a
jurisdictional question equivalent to the Article III standing question: "Dismissal for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the federal claim is proper only
[Vol. 43:725
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Six justices, however, expressed disagreement with an absolute
rejection of hypothetical jurisdiction. Justice O'Connor (joined by Justice
Kennedy) noted that exceptions to the general jurisdiction-merits sequence
had been made in the past and could possibly be justified in the future.
32
Justice Breyer concurred similarly.33 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, would have avoided the standing question under the Ashwander
doctrine: because the statutory question resulted in the same outcome-
dismissal of the plaintiffs suit-the plurality had no reason to elaborate on
the requirements of Article I1.
34
Steel Co. thus provides the backdrop for the jurisdictional-
resequencing cases: while only four justices voted for a mandatory order of
operations under which subject-matter jurisdiction questions would always
precede merits questions, a majority ruled that federal courts should, absent
strong justifications to the contrary, decide subject-matter jurisdiction
before reaching any merits questions.
B. Jurisdictional Resequencing: Rurhgas and Sinochem
Steel Co. focused on the logical hierarchy between jurisdiction and
merits questions; the Court in Ruhrgas and Sinochem faced the question
whether a similar hierarchy existed between different jurisdictional
questions-specifically, subject-matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction in Ruhrgas, and subject-matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens in Sinochem.35 The Court-
unanimous in both cases--declined to impose a strict order of operations
among such threshold questions.36
when the claim is so insubstantial . . .or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to
involve a federal controversy," an argument not plausible in this case. Id. at 89 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
32. See id. at 110-11 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[ln my view, the Court's opinion
should not be read as cataloging an exhaustive list of circumstances under which federal
courts may exercise judgment in 'reserv[ing] difficult questions of... jurisdiction when the
case alternatively could be resolved on the merits in favor of the same party . (quoting
Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532 (1976))).
33. See id. at 111 ("The Constitution does not impose a rigid judicial 'order of
operations,' when doing so would cause serious practical problems." (citations omitted)).
34. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 123-24 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[I]f a case can be
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.")
(citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring))).
35. Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1188 (2007);
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577-78 (1999).
36. Sinochem, 127 S. Ct. at 1188; Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 577-78.
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
1. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.
In Ruhrgas, a group of related oil companies (two American and one
Norwegian) sued a German purchaser for a variety of torts, including fraud,
over a deal involving gas produced in the Norwegian North Sea.37 The oil
companies (collectively, Marathon) brought suit in Texas state court; the
purchaser (Ruhrgas) removed to federal court and then sought dismissal for
lack of personal jurisdiction.38
Ruhrgas claimed three possible bases for federal jurisdiction in
justifying its removal. All were complicated: Ruhrgas contended that
diversity jurisdiction existed because the Norwegian plaintiff had been
fraudulently joined to defeat diversity; that federal question jurisdiction
existed under the federal common law of foreign and international
relations; and that 9 U.S.C. § 205, permitting removal of cases relating to
international arbitration agreements, authorized jurisdiction.39 The personal
jurisdiction question, by contrast, was ordinary: Marathon had asserted
jurisdiction over Ruhrgas on the basis of only three meetings in Houston
and certain correspondence between Ruhrgas and Marathon; Ruhrgas had
no other contacts with Texas.40 The district court thus dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction without addressing the subject-matter jurisdiction
question.4'
The Fifth Circuit reversed: in a removed case, the court said, it was
particularly crucial that the court address subject-matter jurisdiction first;
otherwise, a determination of facts by the federal court might infringe on
the prerogatives of the state court in later litigation. The panel then found
that none of Ruhrgas's claimed bases for subject-matter jurisdiction
survived scrutiny and ordered the case remanded to Texas state court.42 On
rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit agreed that the question of subject-
matter jurisdiction was logically prior to that of personal jurisdiction in a
removed case, but vacated the panel's decision, remanding to the district
37. 526 U.S. at 578-79.
38. Id. at 579-80.
39. Id. The argument under 9 U.S.C. § 205 arose because the contract between the
parties provided for arbitration in Sweden. Id. at 579.
40. Id. at 579.
41. Id. at 580.
42. Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 115 F.3d 315, 318-21 (5th Cir. 1997).
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court for further inquiries into the subject-matter jurisdiction arguments.43
Because the Second Circuit had rejected a rigid hierarchy of jurisdictional
questions, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split.
44
The Court found that subject-matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction were threshold questions that could be addressed in either
order.45 Justice Ginsburg, writing the majority opinion, acknowledged that
"[t]he character of the two jurisdictional bedrocks unquestionably differs":
one limits the power of the courts within the constitutional structure, while
the other protects individuals from arbitrary exercise of power; the latter is
a waivable defect, while the former is nonwaivable.46
Nevertheless, she wrote, subject-matter jurisdiction is not "ever and
always the more 'fundamental. ' ' '47 While ultimately linked to constitutional
requirements, many such questions are statutory rather than constitutional.
The question of whether Marathon had fraudulently defeated diversity, for
example, involved no constitutional principle: Article III itself does not
mandate complete diversity, even if 28 U.S.C. § 1332 does.4 8 Personal
jurisdiction, on the other hand, always derives from the Due Process
Clause. 49 Because a court will lack jurisdiction regardless of the path it
chooses to follow to resolve the case, the Steel Co. "principle does not
dictate a sequencing of jurisdictional issues."
50
This is true, Justice Ginsburg wrote, even when the case is removed
from a state court. A personal jurisdiction ruling may well be preclusive in
subsequent state-court litigation, but so may be aspects of a federal court's
43. Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 220, 225 & n.23 (5th Cir. 1998) (en
banc). Holding that:
Because of the novelty of some of the subject-matter jurisdiction claims,
and because our court has been understandably pre-occupied in
reconciling the confused state of our precedent concerning a district
court's obligations, we remand the issue of whether there exists federal
subject-matter jurisdiction to the able district court for its determination
in the first instance.
Id. at 225. The Court added in a footnote that "[a]lthough the district court may consider the
panel opinion persuasive on the question of subject-matter jurisdiction, that opinion has
been vacated and thus is no longer binding precedent, and we express no opinion on that
issue." Id. at 225 n.23 (citations omitted).
44. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 525 U.S. 1039 (1998).
45. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 583.
46. See id. at 583-84.
47. Id. at 584.
48. Id. (citing State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967)).
49. Id. (citing Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982)).
50. Id.
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
subject-matter jurisdiction determinations.51 Moreover, courts can consider
federalism issues in deciding which threshold jurisdictional question to
answer first: "A State's dignitary interest bears consideration when a
district court exercises discretion in a case of this order.,
52
Permitting the federal courts to determine the sequence in which to
address threshold questions allows those courts to address "concerns of
judicial economy and restraint." 53 Thus, whatever Steel Co. said about the
jurisdiction-merits ordering, Ruhrgas AG held that "there is no unyielding
jurisdictional hierarchy."
54
2. Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International
Shipping Corp.
Sinochem reached the same conclusion. In that case, a Chinese
importer sued a Malaysian shipjping company in Chinese court, alleging
fraud related to a bill of lading.5 The Malaysian company (MISC) in turn
sued in the federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
contending that Sinochem had made misrepresentations to the Chinese
court, causing seizure of MISC's vessel and consequent financial loss.
56
Sinochem sought dismissal on the grounds of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens.57
The district court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction in
admiralty and that further discovery might permit it to find personal
jurisdiction. 58 Rather than resolve the personal jurisdiction question
however, it went on to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens. 9 The
Third Circuit held that the district court had improperly reached that
51. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585.
52. Id. at 586.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 578.
55. See Sinochem Int'l Co., Ltd. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1188
(2007).
56. Id. at 1189.
57. Id.
58. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp. Berhad v. Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd., No. 03-3771, 2004
WL 503541, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2004). The court found that the seizure of the vessel
occurred in navigable waters (albeit non-U.S. waters), and the dispute had a sufficient
connection to maritime activities, thus satisfying the requirements of admiralty jurisdiction.
Id. at *3.
59. See id. at* 12.
[Vol. 43:725
2009] JURISDICTIONAL RESEQUENCING AND RESTRAINT 735
question and should first have determined whether personal jurisdiction
was present. 60 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of a split
among the circuit courts of appeal on this sequencing issue.6'
Because "[a] forum non conveniens dismissal 'den[ies] audience to a
case on the merits,'''62 Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court, it is a
threshold question like subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.
Thus, just as in Ruhrgas, a court may address these threshold questions in
any order: "[a] district court may dispose of an action by a forum non
conveniens dismissal, bypassing questions of subject-matter and personal
jurisdiction, when considerations of convenience, fairness, and judicial
economy so warrant. ' '63 In this case, in particular, further proceedings on
personal jurisdiction "would have burdened Sinochem with expense and
delay[, a]nd all to scant purpose. 64
Under both Ruhrgas and Sinochem, then, there is no mandatory order
of operations when answering threshold jurisdictional questions. While
subject-matter jurisdiction should be addressed first in "the mine run of
cases," the federal courts have the discretion to answer other jurisdictional
questions first when circumstances justify that departure.
C. Criticism of Jurisdictional Resequencing
Professor Shapiro identifies Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Ruhrgas as
one of few "puzzlements ' 65 in a jurisprudence that is otherwise
"characterized by qualities that evince judging at its best., 66 The problem,
he contends, is that, if the federal court decides the personal jurisdiction
question, that decision is preclusive in further litigation.67 For a court to
60. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int'l Co., 436 F.3d 349 (3d Cir. 2006),
rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1184 (2007).
61. Sinochem Int'l. Co., Ltd. v. Malay. Int'l. Shipping Corp.
548 U.S. 942 (2006).
62. Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2007)
(quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999)).
63. Id. at 1192.
64. Id. at 1194.
65. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 30-3 1.
66. ld. at 21.
67. See id at 30 ("If the federal court did lack subject-matter jurisdiction (perhaps in
terms of its power under Article III), is it appropriate for that court-given the limited,
nonwaivable subject-matter authority of the judicial branch in our federal system-
nevertheless to be deciding an issue that, under accepted notions of issue preclusion, may
well bar a state court that does have subject matter jurisdiction from considering whether it
has personal jurisdiction over the defendant? Does Ruhrgas, in other words, carry
pragmatism a step too far?"). But see Idleman, supra note 2, at 29-30 n.172 (questioning
applicability of preclusion to such a decision).
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
reach such a decision without first ascertaining its subject-matter
jurisdiction raises the specter of preclusion without power. When this
happens in a removed case, as it did in Ruhrgas, the problem is not simply
a federal court acting in excess of its power: It is the federal court taking
power away from a state court, in violation of federalism. 68 Shapiro's
criticism is restrained, however, for he notes that he is not entirely sure
himself that the case should have been decided differently.69
Not so for Professor Idleman. He contends that the jurisdictional
resequencing contemplated by the Ruhrgas decision is "substantially
illegitimate in relation to virtually all measures of doctrinal validity, '70 and
despite some virtues, "manifests little more than a desire for expediency,
obtained at the expense of actual legitimacy. ' '71 More specifically,
Professor Idleman accuses the Court of ignoring applicable precedent,72
creating an incongruity with general theories of jurisdiction 73 and a
nonconformity with historical concepts of judicial power,74 all making
Ruhrgas "close to the line that separates valid authority from unprincipled
usurpation.,
75
For example, Idleman argues, Ruhrgas notes but "inexplicably
deem[s] irrelevant" "the respective constitutional source of each
jurisdictional requirement." 76 Subject-matter jurisdiction, because its source
is Article III, "is properly characterized as an internal limitation on the
existence of federal judicial power,, 77 while personal jurisdiction, rooted in
the Due Process Clause, "is best characterized as an external limitation"
that does not forbid the Court to act but instead makes any such action in
the absence of personal jurisdiction not binding on the defendant.
78
Subject-matter jurisdiction is logically more fundamental, for without it the
68. See Idleman, supra note 2, at 29-30.
69. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 31 ("These few doubts .. . are described as
puzzlements because ... I am not that sure of my own ground, because the time and space
to delve into the cases in these brief remarks are too limited, and because my own thoughts
may well have been affected by inappropriate influences, for example, in. . . Ruhrgas ... I
represented the losing party.").
70. Idleman, supra note 2, at 4.
71. Id.
72. Id at 20-30.
73. Id. at 30-39.
74. Id. at 39-72.
75. Id. at 98.
76. Idleman, supra note 2, at 33, 35.
77. Id. at 33 (emphasis omitted).
78. Id. (emphasis omitted).
[Vol. 43:725
2009] JURISDICTIONAL RESEQUENCING AND RESTRAINT 737
Court lacks power to act; moreover, violation of the subject-matter
restriction harms "the people as a whole-the very source of federal
sovereignty.
79
If Professor Shapiro is correct, Ruhrgas is a puzzlement-albeit a
"flyspeck[] in a judicial record that represents the best qualities a judge can
have. 80 If Professor Idleman is right, Ruhrgas (and presumably Sinochem)
are considerably worse than flyspecks and embody poor judging. These
accusations are serious and, what is most surprising, are leveled against
opinions written by a Justice recognized as one of our most careful jurists.8'
What explains this incongruity? That explanation is my task in the next
Part.
II. Resequencing and Restraint
In this Part, I explain that the criticisms made of Ruhrgas and
Sinochem overlook crucial justifications for the jurisdictional resequencing
doctrine. When those opinions are properly understood, they make sense on
their own terms and they square with Justice Ginsburg's view of the
judiciary in our government's structure. It is necessary first to sketch a
picture of that view, before returning to Ruhrgas and Sinochem.
A. Justice Ginsburg's View of the Third Branch
As I have already noted, Justice Ginsburg is known for her restrained
approach to judging, and she has written about this in the context of day-to-
day judicial work. Cases are normally to be resolved on the narrowest
ground possible (although sometimes broader decisions are necessary).
82
Separate opinions should be used sparingly; concurrences should
emphasize shared views and questions left open; dissents should be
cordial.83
79. Id. at 36-37.
80. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 31.
81. See sources cited supra note 1.
82. See generally Ray, supra note 1, at 680 (noting that Justice Ginsburg's general
policy of seeking a narrow decision sometimes gives way on issues where forward-looking
guidance from the Court is necessary).
83. See Judicial Voice, supra note 1, at 1191; see also Shapiro, supra note 1, at 27-28.
One of the Justice's admirable qualities as a judge is her willingness to
write a concurrence (often a brief one, and, if possible, joining in the
Court's opinion as well as its judgment) pointing out what the Court has
not decided (or in some instances need not have decided). In my view,
this judicial strategy is far more effective in its implications for the
future than the well-known and overused "parade of horribles" in an
overblown dissent.
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One might pursue a restrained judicial path simply because
collegiality is essential to the kind of group decisions made by judicial
panels. 84 But Justice Ginsburg has made clear that her restraint arises more
fundamentally from an institutional perspective: the knowledge that courts
maintain their power when they perform their appointed role in a way that
maintains the faith of the people in the institution." When multiple
opinions present a splintered resolution of a case, or when dissents
undermine the credibility of the majority, the faith of the people in that
judgment is threatened. 86 When a court issues a decision that seems to go
beyond what is required to resolve the parties' dispute, it flirts with
accusations of illegitimacy. 87 At the same time, separate opinions can serve
an important role in our polity. For example, when a majority has given a
problematic interpretation of a statute, writing separately may well be
appropriate: "Rather than simply let sleeping dogs lie, a separate opinion
may serve as a call for rectification by nonjudicial hands, by Congress or
an executive agency. It may be important for future policy-making and




84. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis
James P. White Lecture on Legal Education, 40 IND. L. REV. 479, 481 (2007) ("Collegiality
is key to the effective operation of a multi-member bench."); see also An Open Discussion
with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033, 1033-35 (2004) (describing
Court customs that foster collegiality).
85. See Judicial Voice, supra note 1, at 1186 ("The judiciary, Hamilton wrote, from the
very nature of its functions, will always be 'the least dangerous' branch of government, for
judges hold neither the sword nor the purse of the community; ultimately, they must depend
upon the political branches to effectuate their judgments." (quoting ThE FEDERALIST No. 78,
at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
86. See id. at 1191.
But overindulgence in separate opinion writing may undermine both the
reputation of the judiciary for judgment and the respect accorded court
dispositions. Rule of law virtues of consistency, predictability, clarity,
and stability may be slighted when a court routinely fails to act as a
collegial body. Dangers to the system are posed by two tendencies: too
frequent resort to separate opinions and the immoderate tone of
statements diverging from the position of the court's majority.
Id. (footnote omitted); Writing Separately, supra note 1, at 142 ("Concern for the well-being
of the court on which one serves, for the authority and respect its pronouncements
command, may be the most powerful deterrent to writing separately.").
87. See Judicial Voice, supra note 1, at 1191.
88. Writing Separately, supra note 1, at 145 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Thus, as then-Judge Ginsburg stated in her Supreme Court
confirmation hearings, "[m]y approach, I believe, is neither 'liberal' nor
'conservative.' Rather, it is rooted in the place of the judiciary--of
judges-in our democratic society., 89 She has emphasized that "judges
play an interdependent part in our democracy. They do not alone shape
legal doctrine but... participate in a dialogue with other organs of
government, and with the people as well." 90 A court approaching its job
properly will not reach out to rule definitively on controversial issues, thus
blocking the elected branches, but will instead toss "[t]he ball ... back into
the legislators' court, where the political forces of the day [can] operate." 9'
As Linda Greenhouse has put it, Justice Ginsburg has "a pragmatist's sense
that the most efficacious way of achieving the Constitution's highest
potential as an engine of social progress is not necessarily through the
exercise of judicial supremacy. 92
89. MERSKY ET. AL, supra note 11, at 260.
90. Judicial Voice, supra note 1, at 1198.
91. Id. at 1204-05. The duty to respect the other branches is reciprocal: then-Judge
Ginsburg wrote of a mechanism that would permit Congress to participate more effectively
in saving the courts from imprecise and ambiguous statutes. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A
Plea for Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 995, 996, 1011-13 (1987) [hereinafter
Legislative Review]. Such statutes pose a threat to the courts, because they "prompt
'disagreement among different judges and panels,' yielding 'inconsistency and
unpredictability in the interpretation of the law."' Id. at 996 (quoting Harry T. Edwards, The
Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal
Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 385, 425-26 (1983-84)). Judge Ginsburg
suggested a standing committee in Congress that would clarify and revise those statutes that
courts identified as problematic. Id. at 1011-17. While her 1987 article focused on the
efficiency that would be fostered by such attention from Congress, she has elsewhere noted
the institutional costs to courts from Congress's failures. See id at 1017; see also Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial Activism: A 'Liberal' or 'Conservative' Technique?, 15
GA. L. REv. 539, 548 (1981) ("Courts are vulnerable to criticism for overreaching when
Congress is too busy or too divided politically to speak with precision." (footnote omitted));
see also id at 551 (criticizing a proposal to increase judicial review of agency action,
describing it as "an avoidance device, a proposal to assign to the courts the responsibility
that Congress should assume in the form of closer oversight of agency output and more
precise standard-setting in statutes delegating authority to agencies").
92. Linda Greenhouse, Learning to Listen to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 7 N.Y. CiTY L. REV.
213, 218 (2004).
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Then-Judge Ginsburg suggested, for example, that Roe v. Wade had
gone too far,93 not because women lacked the right established there94 but
because Roe cut short national- and state-level political debate on abortion
and thus became "a storm center" that led to "the mobilization of a right-to-
life movement and an attendant reaction in Congress and state
legislatures. 95 In Roe, "[h]eavy handed judicial intervention... appear[ed]
to have provoked, not resolved, conflict."
96
The Court's sex-based employment discrimination cases, by contrast,
"proceeded cautiously [and took] no giant step. 97 Because these cases
"largely trailed and mirrored changing patterns in society... [they]
provoked no outraged opposition in legislative chambers." 98 Moreover, in
those cases, "the Court ... opened a dialogue with the political branches of
government."
99
Then-Judge Ginsburg noted that courts may sometimes need to "step
ahead of the political branches," citing specifically Brown v. Board of
Education.00 But even there, her focus is on the functioning of our
republic: "prospects in 1954 for state legislation dismantling racially
segregated schools were bleak," and because Jim Crow's purpose and
93. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375, 376, 381-82, 385-86 (1985) [hereinafter Autonomy and
Equality]; see also Judicial Voice, supra note 1, at 1198-1208.
94. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting from judgment upholding ban on intact dilation and evacuation
abortions and noting that prior cases had "described the centrality of the decision whether to
bear a child to a woman's dignity and autonomy, her personhood and destiny, her
conception of her place in society" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
95. Autonomy and Equality, supra note 93, at 376, 381.
96. Id. at 385-86.
97. Id. at 378 (noting that, while the Court's race discrimination cases took up (albeit
one hundred years later) the promise of equality made by the Reconstruction Congress, the
sex discrimination cases had "[n]o similar foundation, set deliberately by actors in the
political arena").
98. Id.
99. Judicial Voice, supra note 1, at 1204.
100. Id. at 1206.
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effect was to prevent any dialogue between the races, there was "no...
prospect for educating the white majority." 10 1 Thus, court action was
necessary to remedy a failure in the political system.1
2
But courts are, as they should be, reluctant to take on such battles:
Such litigation "is business the courts do not like, and will undertake, when
pressed by litigants, only in the last resort, when the political branches-the
legislature and the executive-have failed to carry out their constitutional
responsibilities, despite notice, and ample opportunity to address the
problem."' 0 3 Nor are courts the only protectors of human liberty: "the
legislature is sometimes more sensitive to individual rights and the winds
101. Id. (contrasting race discrimination with sex discrimination, where "education of
others-of fathers, husbands, sons as well as daughters-could begin, or be reinforced, at
home").
The role of the judicial branch as a check on the majority's excesses was outlined in
footnote four of Carolene Products, where the Court asked (without deciding) "whether
legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial
scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other
types of legislation." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
The Court specifically noted that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry." Id.
102. See id.; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to
Repair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 301, 303 (1979). In that article,
then-Professor Ginsburg addressed the problem of remedy in equal protection cases-
should courts be able to extend government benefits to embrace a class of people
unconstitutionally excluded, or is judicial power limited to striking down the
unconstitutional statute? Critics had suggested that a plaintiff lacked standing to challenge a
statute that gave benefits to one group but not to his: "'[P]laintiff does not complain about
what Congress enacted ... [but] about what Congress has not enacted. Plaintiff therefore
has chosen the wrong forum to obtain the relief he seeks. He should take his complaint to
Congress."' Id. (quoting Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, at 20, Wiesenfeld
v. Sec'y of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)). Professor Ginsburg responded to those critics by pointing
out that their argument "would immunize from judicial review statutes that confer benefits
unevenly. The legislature would have power, unchecked by the judiciary, to contract the
equal protection principle in a significant class of cases." Id. Moreover, she pointed out, to
limit the remedies available might create a worse institutional problem: "The courts act
legitimately, I am convinced, when they employ common sense and sound judgment to
preserve a law by moderate extension [of its benefits to an otherwise excluded class] where
tearing it down would be far more destructive of the legislature's will." Id. at 324.
103. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Overview of Court Review for Constitutionality in the
United States, 57 LA. L. REv. 1019, 1026 (1997) (referring specifically to structural reform
litigation).
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of change than the Court is,"' 4 and the courts themselves can be guilty of
"dreadful mistakes." 10 5 Thus, while the power of judicial review is essential
to our constitutional balance of powers, 0 6 it-and the other powers granted
to the judiciary by Article III-should be exercised circumspectly.
B. Resequencing as a Limit on Judicial Power
Ruhrgas and Sinochem reflect this consistent attention to institutional
balance in our republic. To be sure, most comments on the jurisdictional
resequencing cases have focused on the efficiency justification: courts
should be able to decide the easiest jurisdictional question first, because
otherwise the resources of the judicial branch are wasted. 0 7 This reason is
certainly foremost in the cases. In Sinochem, for example, the Court holds
that a district court may choose to answer a forum non conveniens question
before a subject-matter or personal jurisdiction question "when
considerations of convenience, fairness, and judicial economy so
warrant."'' 0 8 Similarly, in Ruhrgas, resequencing is permissible given
"concerns of judicial economy."10 9
Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in Ruhrgas also, however,
notes that resequencing is permissible given "concerns of... restraint."' 10
What is "restrained" about a decision that may, in a removed case such as
Ruhrgas, trample on state-court prerogatives; 11 or a decision that may, as
in Sinochem, involve a court in addressing questions of international
104. Remarks of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, March 11, 2004, CUNY School of Law, 7 N.Y.
CiTY L. REV. 221, 230 (2004) (recounting the story of Belva Lockwood, who was denied
admission to the Supreme Court bar until Congress ordered her admission, at which point
she became the first woman admitted to that bar).
105. Ginsburg, supra note 103, at 1024 (citing as an example "the infamous 1857 Dred
Scott decision," 60 U.S. 393 (1856 Term)).
106. See id at 1021-22 (noting that the power of judicial review is not an ineluctable
command of the Constitution and asserting that "[t]he additional check of court review may
be explained on several grounds").
107. See, e.g. J. Stanton Hill, Towards Global Convenience, Fairness, and Judicial
Economy: An Argument in Support of Conditional Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals
Before Determining Jurisdiction in United States Federal District Courts, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1177, 1181 (2008) (arguing that courts should be allowed to conditionally
dismiss under forum non conveniens before establishing jurisdiction for reasons of
convenience, fairness, and judicial economy).
108. 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2007).
109. 526 U.S. 574, 586 (1999).
110. Id.
111. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 30.
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comity before it has determined its own jurisdiction? The answer lies in
Justice Ginsburg's long-standing focus on the role of the federal courts
within the constitutional structure.
Remember that both Ruhrgas and Sinochem permit resequencing only
when the subject-matter jurisdiction question is appreciably more
complicated than the other threshold question." 2 A complicated subject-
matter jurisdiction question may be constitutional or, as in Ruhrgas,
statutory. In either case, a court is being asked to determine the limits of its
own power within our tripartite system of government, precisely the
situation in which we have most reason to be concerned about a court's
error. 3 Resequencing permits a court-which should be alive to the
possibility that it might decide wrongly-to avoid treading on the boundary
of its power, when it would lack jurisdiction for another threshold reason.
I note that, in Ruhrgas, the Court had jurisdiction as a matter of
Article III power, because minimal diversity existed between the parties; in
other words, the possibly fraudulent joinder of the Norwegian company did
not defeat constitutional jurisdiction but merely the complete diversity
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 14 Even Professor Idleman seems to
acknowledge that statutory subject-matter jurisdiction questions may be
resequenced, so long as there is no underlying problem of Article III
jurisdiction." 5 But even if the court faces a complicated constitutional
question of jurisdiction, and if the result under any question is that the court
lacks jurisdiction, there is a good argument that permitting the court to
answer the simpler question-and by so doing to avoid entangling itself in
112. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 588 ("Where, as here, however, a district court has before
it a straightforward personal jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law,
and the alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, the
court does not abuse its discretion by turning directly to personal jurisdiction."); see also
Sinochem, 127 S. Ct. at 1192.
113. Indeed, some cases in the context of administrative law suggest that we should be
more suspicious of an entity when it issues a decision assessing its own power. See, e.g., N.
Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 2002) (refusing to apply
Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation of its own jurisdiction). But see, e.g.,
E.E.O.C. v. Seafarers Int'l. Union, 394 F.3d 197, 201 (4th Cir. 2005) (giving Chevron
deference to agency's interpretation of its own jurisdiction).
114. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584 ("In this case,... the impediment to subject-matter
jurisdiction on which Marathon relies-lack of complete diversity-rests on statutory
interpretation, not constitutional command. Marathon joined an alien plaintiff (Norge) as
well as an alien defendant (Ruhrgas). If the joinder of Norge is legitimate, the complete
diversity required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 . .. but not by Article III, .... is absent." (citation
omitted)).
115. See Idleman, supra note 2, at 70 ("The rule [against resequencing] could even be a
narrow one, requiring only that lower courts address the core Article III requirements first,
leaving to their discretion the potential resequencing of other jurisdictional issues.").
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the intricacies of a question it might get wrong-is the better course. It was
for this reason that four Justices, including Justice Ginsburg, wrote
separately in Steel Co.
116
In any event, the fact that a particular subject-matter jurisdiction
question is statutory, as in Ruhrgas,1 7 does not mean that an answer to that
question is devoid of constitutional import. Article III commits to Congress
the power to create the lower courts. 1 8 Congress exercises that power by
statute. If a jurisdictional statute raises a complicated question of
interpretation, a court will necessarily risk making a mistake in divining
Congress's intent. Lurking behind any such statutory question is always a
constitutional separation-of-powers question: whether the court should
venture to engage directly with the actions of a coordinate branch of
government. 19
By contrast, a determination of personal jurisdiction or forum non
conveniens has little institutional import and creates fewer incentives for
abuse. Especially when such a question is easily resolved, there is little
reason to worry that the court is overstepping its bounds. Even if the court
exercises power that might, for a purist, be considered ultra vires, that
decision allows the court to avoid what could be a troubling subject-matter
jurisdiction question-one that may well involve serious questions of
institutional power-at virtually no cost. After all, if the answer to a
personal jurisdiction question is obvious, any other state or federal court
sitting in that state should have dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Once these larger separation-of-powers issues are recognized, the
formalistic insistence on answering subject-matter jurisdiction questions
seems unjustifiable. Even if, as Professor Idleman contends, "the people as
a whole-the very source of federal sovereignty" are harmed when a court
fails to ascertain its subject-matter jurisdiction before proceeding to any
other question, 120 the people as a whole are also harmed when a court
unnecessarily confronts a jurisdictional question-whether statutory or
constitutional-when no answer to that question is needed to dismiss the
case.
116. See supra notes 18-34 and accompanying text.
117. 526 U.S. at 581-82.
118. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
119. "Detecting the will of the legislature ... time and again perplexes even the most
restrained judicial mind .... The will of the national legislature is too often expressed in
commands that are unclear, imprecise, or gap-ridden .... Legislative Review, supra note
91, at 995-96. Professor Idleman notes the separation-of-powers restraint on judicial power
in passing, but takes the point no further. See Idleman, supra note 2, at 44 n.246.
120. Idleman, supra note 2, at 36-37.
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If the harm to the people is identifiable in either case, then the
question becomes which harm is best avoided. As the Court has long
suggested, a court does best to avoid constitutional questions that are
unnecessary to the resolution of a case. 121 It is perhaps for this reason that
the decisions in Ruhrgas and Sinochem were unanimous.1
22
To be sure, the issue is trickier when the personal jurisdiction
question is complex but still more readily answered than the subject-matter
jurisdiction question. Here, as Professor Shapiro worries, a court might
reach an incorrect decision on the personal jurisdiction question, which
through preclusion could impinge on the power of a state court to decide
that question if the case is refiled. 123 One might nevertheless believe that
answering the personal jurisdiction question has fewer long-term
institutional consequences: the determination is on the specific facts of one
case regarding jurisdiction over a particular defendant, while a subject-
matter jurisdiction question may well involve interpretation of a statute or a
constitutional grant of power that would be more broadly influential. 1
24
121. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) ("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a
constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the
Court will decide only the latter.").
122. See Sinochem Int'l. Co. Ltd. v. Malay. Int'l. Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1188
(2007); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999).
123. As discussed above, the preclusion question may be more complicated than might
first appear. See supra note 67.
124. It is of course true that all personal-jurisdiction cases, even the influential ones, are
at some level merely about a particular defendant, and it is thus also true that a court's
answer to a personal-jurisdiction question can have consequences that reach further than the
particular case. When, however, a case raises the kind of complex and novel issues of
personal jurisdiction that might lead it to have an effect on other cases, it seems unlikely to
be the first question addressed by a court that has concerns about its ability to proceed with
the case because of multiple jurisdictional issues.
It is also true that that some subject-matter jurisdiction questions turn on banal factual
inquiries that have almost no effect beyond the case at bar. For example, an amount-in-
controversy question may boil down to whether the plaintiff could, in good faith, have
claimed an amount in excess of $75,000. See, e.g., Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc.,
370 F.3d 124, 126-29 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that a girl who cut her pinky finger on a tuna-
fish can satisfied the amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, because given
the extent of the resulting injury, "we cannot say to a legal certainty that Beatriz could not
recover a jury award larger than $75,000"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005). It seems unlikely, however, that a
court would find this kind of subject-matter jurisdiction question the kind that justifies
resequencing. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 587 ("[W]e recognize that in most instances subject-
matter jurisdiction will involve no arduous inquiry.").
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Thus, resequencing permits courts to avoid complex questions about
the margins of their power. When the question is statutory-in other words,
when Congress is responsible for defining the margins-resequencing
allows courts to pretermit precisely the kinds of questions that might
otherwise cause the courts to confront Congress unnecessarily. Even when
the question is constitutional, resequencing allows a court to avoid a
difficult constitutional question when the result is a jurisdictional dismissal.
Properly understood, therefore, neither Ruhrgas nor Sinochem authorize
court action ultra vires; instead, they add to the range of tools that courts
may use to maintain their proper role in our republic.
1 25
125. One criticism made of resequencing is that it leads courts to put off difficult
jurisdictional questions so that they are never answered. See Idleman, supra note 2, at 17-18.
Resequencing jurisdictional questions to avoid the tough subject-matter jurisdiction
question,
may not be economical to the extent that it merely perpetuates the
difficulty for the next court and, indeed, for every court after that. From
a system-wide perspective, in other words, resolving difficult
jurisdictional issues at the time they are presented, though potentially
inefficient for the court at hand, may ultimately be the more judicially
economical approach.
Id. (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
One might contend that this argument echoes that adopted by the Court in Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (noting that in qualified immunity cases, courts should
resolve questions of whether a constitutional right was violated, because otherwise "[tihe
law might be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the question
whether the law clearly established that the officer's conduct was unlawful in the
circumstances of the case"). The Court retreated from Saucier just this term, on efficiency
terms that echo the resequencing cases. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009)
("[T]he rigid Saucier procedure comes with a price. The procedure sometimes results in a
substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions that have no effect
on the outcome of the case.").
In any event, the resequencing cases do not present the same threat. For resequencing to
occur, a court must face at least two threshold questions, each of which is sufficient to
resolve the case. It seems to me implausible that, in every question raising a difficult
subject-matter jurisdiction issue, there will always also be a personal jurisdiction question,
or a forum non conveniens question, or an Eleventh Amendment immunity question, or
some other threshold question that will give the court a way to avoid the difficult subject-
matter question. For example, the jurisdictional question that took over thirty-two pages for
the Court to answer in Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh is surely the kind
of question a court would hope to avoid, yet it was answered. 126 S. Ct. 2121 (2006)
(finding federal question jurisdiction lacking for a case involving health-care reimbursement
and discussing at length theories of federal question jurisdiction under Clearfield Trust v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15
(1982), and Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308
(2005)).
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III. Resequencing in the Larger Picture
A similar concern for the constitutional balance of powers lies behind
other, better received opinions by Justice Ginsburg, including Friends of
the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.' 26 Ruhrgas and
Sinochem are thus not departures from Justice Ginsburg's jurisprudence of
restraint, but entirely consistent with it.
In her opinion for the Court in Laidlaw, for example, Justice Ginsburg
wrote an opinion supporting standing in an environmental case that was a
striking-and salutary'ZT-about-face in what had seemed an unstoppable
march 128 toward eradicating most forms of public-interest lawsuits in the
guise of Article III restraint. The prior cases had repeatedly denied standing
to citizen suitors, in part out of fear that Congress was intruding on the
province of the executive by permitting citizen suits: as Justice Scalia wrote
for the Court in Lujan, a strong doctrine of standing limits Congress's
ability to turn the courts into "'virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom
and soundness of Executive action."",129 Those standing cases were widely
criticized for arrogating to the Court vast powers that properly lay with
Congress.
30
In Laidlaw, by contrast, the Court through Justice Ginsburg reined in
the excesses of the standing doctrine, explicitly in favor of a different
conception of separation of powers: it is not the role of the Court to limit
Congress's legislative power through increasingly narrow rules of standing
(here, by finding that the remedy Congress made available in a citizen suit
could not satisfy the standing requirement of redressability).131 Instead,
126. 528 U.S. 167, 171 (2000).
127. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 1, at 24 (referring to the opinion as "a drink of clean
water").
128. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 86, 109-10
(1998) (holding that environmental group lacked standing to bring action under the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 557-58, 578 (1992) (holding that wildlife conservation groups
lacked standing to bring action under the Endangered Species Act of 1973); Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 739, 766 (1984) (holding that parents of African-American public school
children lacked standing to bring action against the Internal Revenue Service).
129. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 760).
130. See, e.g., Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REv. 459 (2008);
Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432,
1458 (1988); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 221-22
(1988).
131. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 187 (deferring to congressional determination of what
remedies would achieve congressional goals by deterring undesirable behavior and noting
that choice of remedy "'is a matter within the legislature's range of choice. Judgment on the
deterrent effect of the various weapons in the armory of the law can lay little claim to
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Justice Ginsburg wrote, Congress's choice of remedy deserved deference.
For the Court to use standing to interfere with congressional purpose would
be to exceed the bounds of the judicial power.
132
Justice Ginsburg has written other opinions with similar attention to
the role of the unelected judiciary in our democratic republic. Professor
Shapiro points to her dissent in Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudsen, 133 where her analysis "goes to the heart of the judicial role in the
interpretation of legislation... emphasiz[ing] a sophisticated
understanding of legislative purpose and the proper role of the Court in
promoting that purpose.
1 34
Similarly, Justice Ginsburg has used her separate opinions to invite
the participation of the democratic branches in resolving disputes. As
Professor Guinier has explained, "Justice Ginsburg has... offered dissents
spurring real world action. She has engaged in an ongoing conversation
about the meaning of right and wrong in what Professor Neal Katyal might
call 'advicegiving' to Congress or what Professor Joe Sax called a
'legislative remand."" 35 Thus, Guinier explains, in the recent case of
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 3 6 Justice Ginsburg used her
dissent to elicit the participation of the democratic branches:
Witness Justice Ginsburg's oral dissent in Ledbetter, after which
the House of Representatives responded quickly to her call for a
legislative fix to the Court majority's crabbed reading of a
congressional statute. Despite the fact that she represented a
minority view, Justice Ginsburg's a R eal to the political
branches gave that view greater traction.
scientific basis' (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 148 (1940))); see also Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Comment, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed
Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DuKE L.J. 1170, 1170-71, 1195-201 (1993) (arguing that
Lujan is aimed at "the evisceration of the principle of legislative supremacy"),
132. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 24 (describing Laidlaw as a welcome change from
"decisions in which the requirements [of justiciability] seem to have become insuperable
barriers to effective law enforcement"); see also Elliott, supra note 130 (noting that the view
of separation of powers reflected by Justice Scalia's opinion in Lujan and later in dissent in
Laidlaw was "hotly contested").
133. 534 U.S. 204, 224 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
134. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 23.
135. Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARv. L. REv. 4, 40
(2008) (citing Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges As Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1727
(1998); JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION
157 (1971)); see also Judicial Voice, supra note 1, at 1191.
136. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
137. Guinier, supra note 135, at 60-61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The recent cases regarding detainees at the Guantanamo Bay military
prison arise in perhaps the most freighted context of all, demonstrating the
careful balance in the exercise of judicial power that Justice Ginsburg
demands. 138 In Hamdi, Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter in avoiding
the constitutional challenge raised by the detainees, instead resolving the
case on a narrow statutory ground;139 in Rasul, she joined the majority in
deciding merely that jurisdiction over the detainees' habeas petitions
existed, remanding the petitions for further decision in the lower courts;
140
in Hamdan, she joined the majority in holding that Congress had not acted
clearly to strip the courts of jurisdiction over the detainees' petitions.' 4 1 In
all these decisions, Justice Ginsburg voted to constrain the power of
Congress and the Executive. For example, she later described the Court's
opinion in Hamdan in this way:
The Court's decision was rooted in the Constitution's division of
authority among three branches of government. Concentration of
power in the Executive Branch, the Court observed, is
antithetical to the Constitution's tripartite scheme. It is the
Court's obligation.., to make certain that if military tribunals
are established to classify and try the Guantdnamo detainees, the
lawmaking branch--Congress-has approved that course.142
At the same time, she has decided those questions narrowly,
recognizing that sweeping decisions are those most likely to call the
legitimacy of courts' power into question. 1
43
As these cases and her academic writing show, Justice Ginsburg has
consistently been concerned with maintaining the proper role of the federal
judge-appointed to life tenure rather than subject to the control of the
138. For a discussion of the Guantanamo Bay cases, including the Court's most recent
decision, see generally Daniel R. Williams, Who Got Game? Boumediene v. Bush and the
Judicial Gamesmanship of Enemy-Combatant Detention, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (2008);
Geoffrey S. Corn, The Role of the Courts in the War on Terror: The Intersection of
Hyperbole, Military Necessity, and Judicial Review, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 17 (2008);
Douglass Cassel, Liberty, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law at Guantanamo: A Battle
Half Won, 43 NEw ENG. L. REV. 37 (2008).
139. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
140. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
141. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 574-76 (2006).
142. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Judicial Independence: The Situation of the U.S. Federal
Judiciary, 85 NEB. L. REV. 1, 14 (2006).
143. See generally id. (discussing the Guantanamo cases as part of a larger discussion of
threats to the independence of federal judges).
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ballot box-in our tripartite structure of government. As shown above, that
concern for the proper role carries through in the jurisdictional-
resequencing decisions.
CONCLUSION
I started this Article by noting that Justice Ginsburg is known for her
jurisprudence of restraint, 44 and yet the jurisdictional-resequencing
opinions she has written have been described as essentially lawless. 145 It
has been my mission here to repudiate that view and to explain that
Ruhrgas and Sinochem are instead consistent with the Justice's larger
jurisprudence, particularly her career-long respect for the role of an
unelected judiciary in our system of separated powers. Rather than inviting
judicial anarchy, both cases reflect the careful attention of one who
"display[s] the traits of judicial greatness.'
146
144. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
145. See supra Part I.C. (describing in particular Professor Idleman's criticisms).
146. Gerald Gunther, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Personal, Very Fond Tribute, 20 U. HAw.
L. REv. 583, 586 (1998).
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